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Before the advent of title registration, if a transaction was tainted by a vitiating factor, one 
would ask whether the transaction was void or voidable and, if the former, the nemo dat rule 
would apply and the innocent victim would recover their title unencumbered by any dealings 
that the wrongdoer had sought to transact. Now, under the Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002 
as it has been interpreted in Swift 1st v Chief Land Registrar ([2015] EWCA Civ 330; [2015] 
Ch. 602), a victim gets no comfort from the nemo dat rule. If they wish to recover their title, 
they must instead establish either that they have proprietary priority over the current 
registered proprietor (under ss. 28 or 29 of the Act) or else achieve rectification of the register 
under Schedule 4 of the Act. Failing these, they are left with the possibility of an indemnity 
under Schedule 8 of the Act. In Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation 
Paper (Law Com. No. 227 (2016)), the Law Commission indicate that they would not change 
the disapplication of the nemo dat rule given that this enhances the central aim of title 
security (para. 5.35 et seq). Unfortunately, of course, wrongdoing does not diminish just 
because we look at it differently, and in Mortgage Express v Lambert ([2016] EWCA Civ 
555) the Court of Appeal had to untangle the claims of a duped former title holder and the 
innocent lender that now held a registered charge granted by the wrongdoers. In doing so, 
Lewison L.J. (with which Gloster L.J. and Cobb J. agreed without addition) considered the 
interplay between the priority rules and owners’ powers provisions of the LRA 2002 and the 
overreaching provisions of the Law of Property Act (LPA) 1925. His conclusions are 
surprising, revealing and challenging.  
Ms Lambert was the registered proprietor of a leasehold flat worth around £120,000 on the 
open market. She was “in desperate financial straits” (Lambert at [1]) but the internet offered 
a solution in the form of Mr Sinclair and Mr Clement with whom she agreed as sale at 
£30,000. This was duly completed with the purchasers taking title jointly, paying the price by 
means of a bridging loan. Ms Lambert did not, however, quit the property and one issue was 
whether she retained some form of tenancy after the sale – a classic purported sale/leaseback 
of the type at the heart of the litigation in Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages ([2014] UKSC 
52, [2015] 1 A.C. 385). The trial judge thought that this might even be a 90-year lease by 
application of the saving grace of Berrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-operative ([2011] UKSC 
52; [2012] 1 A.C. 955) but the existence of any lease proved unsustainable (see below). As the 
new owners under a contract of sale, Sinclair and Clement then obtained a mortgage from 
Mortgage Express for just under £105,000. The purchasers’ title and the mortgage were 
registered on the same day. Some six months later, title was transferred into Sinclair’s sole 
name (with Mortgage Expresses’ consent) but he defaulted on the payments and the mortgagee 
sought to exercise its remedies. Ms Lambert has fallen behind with her “rent” and resisted 
possession on the ground that the initial sale should be set aside and that this gave her priority 
over the mortgagee. The trial judge accepted that the initial sale was tainted by 
unconscionability but that this did not bind Mortgage Express because it was a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice (Lambert at [6]). Lewison L.J., with perhaps enormous self-
restraint, simply notes that the doctrine of notice has nothing to do with registered title. Indeed, 
it is remarkable that even in 2016 that this has not permeated to all levels of the Bench and Bar. 
Perhaps the less said about this the better. 
On these facts, Ms Lambert was not in the same position as the claimants in either Scott or the 
earlier Abbey National Building Society v Cann ([1991] 1 A.C. 56). It looked like she did have 
some sort of proprietary interest immediately before the mortgage was executed and registered, 
because although the mortgage was registered on the same day as the purchaser’s title, the sale 
by then had been completed and financed by the bridging loan. Any right Ms Lambert had must 
have arisen on the earlier completion funded by the bridging loan (unlike Scott) and the 
mortgage could not be said to be simultaneous with the borrowers’ purchase or indeed required 
for it (unlike Cann). So, we are left with a classic priority contest between innocent purchaser 
and innocent interest holder which allows Lewison L.J. to analyse the priority provisions of the 
LRA 2002 and the overreaching provisions of the LPA 1925. The result is a surprise. 
The first issue is whether Ms Lambert really did have a proprietary interest in the land 
capable of binding Mortgage Express. Ms Lambert originally pleaded an assured shorthold 
tenancy, and the trial judge thought it might be a Mexfield 90-year term, but this line of 
argument was abandoned in the Court of Appeal given the finding of fact at trial that the 
entire transaction should be set aside for unconscionability. The arrangement with Sinclair 
and Clement could not be both devoid of effect and give rise to a lease of any kind at the 
same time [Lambert at [14]). This left the argument that the right to set aside the transaction 
for unconscionability was an “equity” which was now to be treated as proprietary because of 
s. 116 of the LRA 2002. As Lewison L.J. notes, given that the right to set aside a transaction 
for undue influence or misrepresentation are unquestionably such equities [Lambert at [16] 
and [23] and the cases cited therein], it is difficult to see why the same is not true if the 
vitiating factor is unconscionability.  
The problem is, however, that the identification of a new equity (or an established equity 
arising in new circumstances) has the potential unexpectedly to compromise the security of a 
registered charge (or title) because of the intersection of s. 116 and s. 29 LRA 2002. In this 
case, the lender is doubly unfortunate because the property was purchased first with a 
bridging loan pending the completion of Mortgage Express’ registered charge. If Mortgage 
Express’ charge had been used to finance the purchase directly, then there would be no 
question of Ms Lambert’s interest having priority (by reason of an overriding interest through 
actual occupation within para. 2 Schedule 3 LRA 2002) as the lender would have priority as 
being first in time – Abbey National Building Society v Cann ([1991] A.C. 56). Further, 
Mortgage Express can get little comfort by relying on being subrogated to the priority of the 
bridging loan that it paid off (which would seem possible - Equity & Law Home Loans Ltd. v 
Prestidge [1992] 1 W.L.R. 137 - even though not pleaded) because Mortgage Express’ loan 
was for some £75,000 more than the first loan. Of course, one might say that Mortgage 
Express had every chance to discover Ms Lambert and safeguard their priority (perhaps by 
seeking her consent), although it is difficult to see how they could have suspected that she 
had a proprietary interest capable of having priority to their charge – more on which below. 
In fact, Lewison L.J. thinks that there are a number of ways to resolve this problem in favour 
of Mortgage Express. Not all of these are convincing, but one at least requires us to revaluate 
substantially what we thought was a familiar concept. 
First, Lewison L.J. suggests that Mortgage Express is protected by s. 26 LRA 2002. This 
provides that “a person's right to exercise owner's powers in relation to a registered estate or 
charge is to be taken to be free from any limitation affecting the validity of a disposition”, 
save as specified in s. 26(2), being when there is a limitation on the register or imposed by the 
legislation. Further, according to s.26(3), this is to ensure that the “title of a disponee” cannot 
be questioned “(and so does not affect the lawfulness of a disposition).” So, the argument 
runs, that when Sinclair and Clement mortgaged the flat to Mortgage Express, this was a 
disposition they could make (there being no limitation in the register or Act) and the title of 
Mortgage Express could not be questioned (emphasis added) even if there was an overriding 
interest that would otherwise defeat their charge. Indeed, Lewison L.J. points out that there is 
support for this argument in the Law Commission and Land Registry Report which led to the 
2002 Act, because it contains an example which seems to suggest that a purchaser who takes 
the title apparently subject to an overriding interest is protected by s. 26 and the overriding 
interest disapplied (Lambert at [27] citing para. 4.10 of the Report). If this is correct, it 
reduces the role of overriding interests significantly, perhaps rendering them largely otiose, 
because it gives primacy to s. 26 over s. 29 LRA 2002. It also, of course, contradicts more 
case law on the effect of overriding interests than can be listed here. However, with respect, 
this argument is misplaced, and indeed the Law Commission’s example is misleading. The 
purpose of s. 26 is to confirm the status of the disponee’s title not whether it has priority, 
which is the business of section 29. Section 26 means that the disponee’s title is secure even 
if there was a limitation on the disponor’s title, but it says nothing of the effect of overriding 
interests unrelated to that limitation. In fact, the reason why the occupier in the Law 
Commission’s example does not have an overriding interest has nothing to do with s. 26: it is 
because, as the facts of the example make clear, she is overreached by a sale by two trustees 
of land (City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] 1 A.C. 54). The Law Commission is 
not saying that s. 26 trumps s. 29, but that failing to observe a limitation on a disponor’s title 
not entered on the register does not compromise the disponee’s title. With respect, Lewison 
L.J.’s interpretation is a misreading of the combined effect of s. 26 and s. 29 and would 
reduce the concept of overriding interests to an echo in the history of land registration. 
A second way of preserving Mortgage Express’s priority identified by Lewison L.J. relies on 
the qualification found in para. 2 Schedule 3 of the LRA 2002 – that the interest of a person 
in actual occupation will not override if enquiry is made of the right holder and the right is 
not disclosed when it is reasonable to do so. Lewison L.J. notes that Ms Lambert signed a 
standard contract for sale and gave a full title guarantee when she sold to Sinclair and 
Clement, including a promise of vacant possession. As we know, this was an untruth, because 
Ms Lambert believed she had a tenancy under a lease back. In these circumstances, Lewison 
L.J. felt that Ms Lambert had failed to disclose her interest and thus would lose her priority. 
There are, however, difficulties with this argument also. It is true that Mortgage Express were 
supplied with and clearly relied on the conveyancing documents signed by Ms Lambert, and 
perhaps there is an estoppel argument here (Lambert at [43]). But it is unclear whether 
Mortgage Express can benefit from an enquiry they did not make. In any event, the purpose 
behind the “disclosure condition” is not to put an obligation on the right holder to actively 
reveal an interest that would safeguard their priority (and which they may not even know they 
have – as here, Lambert at [41]), but rather to give the right holder an opportunity to disclose 
when reasonably questioned about their status (Begum v Isa [2014] EW Misc B51 (CC)). 
Perhaps the line is a fine one, and perhaps Ms Lambert would have been estopped, but 
interpreting the completion of normal conveyancing documents as a failure to disclose, when 
the specific reason for requiring disclosure is not made clear, is a generous pro-purchaser 
interpretation of the 2002 Act. 
Thirdly, and most significantly of all, Lewison L.J.’s main and decisive reason for rejecting 
Ms Lambert’s claim of priority was that her “mere equity” arising from the unconscionable 
conduct of Sinclair and Clement was overreached when these joint owners charged the flat to 
Mortgage Express (s. 2(1)(ii) LPA 1925 and Flegg). This is significant. Ms Lambert’s 
interest was not an equitable co-ownership interest under a trust of land, the usual 
overreachable interest. It was a mere equity arising from unconscionability. But, as Lewison 
L.J. points out after a careful and persuasive analysis of the overreaching provisions of the 
LPA 1925, there is nothing to suggest that this and other types of equitable interest cannot be 
overreached, save those specifically excluded from overreaching in s. 2(3) LPA 1925. So, 
mere equities and interests arising by estoppel (Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services 
Ltd v Sabherwal (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 256) are capable of being overreached along with 
interests behind trusts. At first reading, this looks remarkable – surely it is only interests 
behind trusts that are overreachable for these are easily quantifiable in money as they 
represent a “share” of the value of the land? But, as Lewison L.J. demonstrates, this is just an 
assumption and the legislation clearly imposes no such limitation. We – especially the 
academic community – have failed in the most basic of skills: reading the statute. Indeed, on 
reflection, it is not even that surprising that equitable rights other than interests behind trusts 
can be overreached. If the “solid” equitable co-ownership share is overreachable, why not the 
mere equity arising from undue influence, misrepresentation and unconscionability, and the 
equity by estoppel. All of these other rights are, in truth, more like claims to relief than being 
substantively valuable and why should a purchaser who complies with s. 2 LPA have to 
suffer these claims when they were not the wrongdoer. Perhaps the drafters of s.2 were more 
prescient than we have given them credit for. That is not to say, however, that this analysis is 
problem free, for it leaves us with some practical problems. For example, given that the effect 
of overreaching is to displace the interest overreached from the land into the capital money 
paid, how do we value an equity arising by undue influence, misrepresentation and 
unconscionability? Do we say that the overreached right holder is entitled to one hundred per 
cent of the money paid because the vitiating factor destroys the whole transaction, or do we 
have to quantify its effect? Also, for estoppels that are overreached, is it relevant that the 
concrete remedy for the estoppel might have been a proprietary interest that is not 
overreachable (e.g. an easement) or is “estoppel overreaching” available only when the 
estoppel would have been satisfied by a “family” type interest (as in Sabherwal)? 
Lambert reminds us to take nothing for granted and it requires us to re-learn what we 
understand by overreaching. Overreaching is not as narrow as many of us had believed. 
Lambert also provides a convenient and balanced solution to the troublesome scenario of an 
innocent purchaser (Mortgage Express) being caught by a property interest (of Ms Lambert) 
generated by the personal wrongdoing of the previous owners (Sinclair and Clement). And it 
is a counterweight to s. 116 LRA that otherwise might cause extra burdens for disponees. But 
only, of course, if there at least two legal owners. A further puzzle though, is why Mortgage 
Express bothered at all? After Swift 1
st
, they may have been entitled to an indemnity from the 
Land Registry if they had surrendered their charge (depending on one’s view of Re Chowood 
[1933] 1 Ch 574) and Ms Lambert could have sought rectification of the register against 
Sinclair, who by then was the sole proprietor. There is still more to be done to untangle the 
relationship between priority, title guarantee, indemnity and rectification. Lambert helps. 
 
 
